Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25050
Authors: 
Schöttner, Anja
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 649 discussion paper 2005,041
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors.
Subjects: 
innovation contest
auction
tournament
quality
JEL: 
D44
H57
L15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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