Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/250317
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2020/7
Publisher: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Abstract: 
We consider the notions of static and dynamic reasonableness of requests by an authority in a trust game experiment. The authority, modelled as the experimenter, systematically varies the experimental norm of what is expected from trustees to return to trustors, both in terms of the level of each request and in terms of the sequence of the requests. Static reasonableness matters in a self-biased way, in the sense that low requests justify returning less, but high requests tend to be ignored. Dynamic reasonableness also matters, in the sense that, if requests keep increasing, trustees return less compared to the same requests presented in random or decreasing order. Requests never systematically increase trustworthiness but may decrease it.
Subjects: 
trust
trustworthiness
authority
reasonableness
moral wiggle room
moral licensing
JEL: 
C91
D01
D03
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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