Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249882 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 659
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
We consider network games in which players simultaneously form partnerships and choose actions. Players are heterogeneous with respect to their action preferences. We characterize pairwise Nash equilibria for a large class of games, including coordination and anti-coordination games, varying the strength of action preferences and the size of the linking cost. We find that, despite the symmetry and simplicity of the setting, quite irregular network structures can arise in equilibrium, implying that heterogeneity in players' action preferences may already explain a large part of observed irregularity in endogenously formed networks.
Subjects: 
network games
strategic network formation
preference heterogeneity
efficiency
JEL: 
C62
C72
D85
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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