Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249738 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Texto para discussão No. 690
Publisher: 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia, Rio de Janeiro
Abstract: 
Central-government politicians channel resources to sub-national entities for political gains. We show formally that the central politicians' allocation decision has two drivers: political alignment (between central and local politicians) and the level of local political accountability. However, drivers count one at a time: alignment matters before local elections, while local political accountability matters before central elections. We then perform a test of our model using Brazilian data, which corroborates our results. Furthermore, we show and explain why political accountability becomes a curse: better-educated districts receive fewer transfers in equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Federalism
Distributive Politics
Partisan Alignment
Voters' Education
Political Accountability
Brazil
JEL: 
D72
H11
H7
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
959.84 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.