Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249725 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Texto para discussão No. 677
Publisher: 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia, Rio de Janeiro
Abstract: 
This paper studies optimal targeting policies, consisting of eliminating (preserving) a set of agents in a network and aimed at minimizing (maximizing) aggregate effort levels. Different from the existing literature, we allow the equilibrium network to adapt after a network intervention and consider targeting of multiple agents. A simple and tractable adjustment process is introduced. We find that allowing the network to adapt may overturn optimal targeting results for a fixed network and that congestion/competition effects are crucial to understanding differences between the two settings.
Subjects: 
Targeting
key player policy
peer effects
local strategic complements
global strategic substitutes
positive externalities
negative externalities
JEL: 
D62
D85
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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