Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249370 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2020:1
Publisher: 
Uppsala University, Department of Economics, Uppsala
Abstract: 
This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. We show that each additional party with representation in Parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 4 percentage points. Governments with more resources at their disposal for bargaining are less likely to be replaced. When they are, new government leaders are younger and better educated, suggesting instability may induce positive selection. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. Our findings indicate that the rising fragmentation in parliaments worldwide may have a substantial impact on stability and political selection.
Subjects: 
Government Stability
Fragmentation
No-confidence votes
Bargaining
Alignment effect
JEL: 
H1
H7
R50
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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