Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249245 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SITE Working Paper No. 50
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
Whistleblower reward programs, or "bounty regimes", are increasingly used in the United States. The effectiveness of these programs have been questioned, and empirical evidence on their effectiveness have been scarce likely due to their relatively recent introduction. In recent years, however, empirical and experimental evidence on their effectiveness have become more available and robust. We review the (rather encouraging) evidence on whistleblower reward programs, in terms of amount of additional information generated, deterrence effects, and administration costs, and consider the possibility of extending them to accomplice-witnesses in antitrust.
Schlagwörter: 
whistleblowers
economy
JEL: 
B26
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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