Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249018 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9473
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
When voters’ trust in politicians collapses, they demand simple policies that they can easily monitor. Disenchanted citizens therefore prefer committed delegates to politicians who propose themselves as competent policy makers but without a specific policy commitment (trustees). In a two-party competition, the unique asymmetric equilibrium is such that voters with lower interest for the common good select a committed delegate, while those with higher interest for the common good appoint a trustee. In this equilibrium, we show that the committed delegate also chooses all the strategies typically associated with populism in the literature. Hence, this paper puts forward a commitment theory of populism.
Subjects: 
populism
competence
commitment
information acquisition
interest groups
moral universalism
JEL: 
D72
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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