Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/249002 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9457
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We report experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods under threshold uncertainty. By explicitly comparing two prominent technologies, summation and weakest link, we show that uncertainty is particularly detrimental to threshold attainment under weakest link, where low contributions by one subject cannot be compensated by others. In contrast, threshold uncertainty does not affect contributions under summation. We demonstrate non-binding pledges as one mechanism to improve chances of threshold attainment under both technologies, yet in particular under weakest link.
Subjects: 
public goods
threshold uncertainty
weakest link
coordination
experiment
JEL: 
C91
H41
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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