Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248919 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9374
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter model and the citizen candidate model. In one-party equilibria, the median voter can be worse off than in all equilibria with two competing parties.
Subjects: 
elections
party formation
platform choice
electoral uncertainty
JEL: 
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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