Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248814 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
JRC Working Papers on Taxation and Structural Reforms No. 01/2020
Verlag: 
European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), Seville
Zusammenfassung: 
Rather than stabilising aggregate demand, discretionary fiscal policy tends to amplify cyclical fluctuations of output. The commonly accepted reasons are political economy and uncertainty. In the EU, the pro-cyclical nature of discretionary fiscal policy has also been associated with the commonly agreed fiscal rules, which, for some observers, unduly limit the scope for stabilising output. Using panel data covering close to 50 EU and non-EU countries, we provide evidence that the uncertainty around output gap estimates is not a convincing explanation for pro-cyclical policies. Discretionary measures remain ill-timed from a stabilisation perspective even when observable and politically more meaningful indicators of the cycle are used. We also show that deviations from fiscal rules and the accumulation of government debt foster pro-cyclical fiscal policy. Lawmakers can run discretionary fiscal policy measures based on political economy considerations up to a point. Once debt grows too high, they are forced to implement fiscal consolidation measures regardless of the cycle. More generally, there is no fiscal rule, which, if consistently ignored, safeguards the opportunity to stabilise output with discretionary fiscal policy measures. Complying with fiscal rules that are designed to keep a steady course in the face of cyclical fluctuation is conducive to counter-cyclical fiscal policy making.
Schlagwörter: 
fiscal policy
fiscal rules
fiscal stabilisation
counter-cyclical policy
dynamic panel models
JEL: 
C23
E61
E62
H30
H60
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by Logo
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
2.06 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.