Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248611 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1152
Publisher: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Abstract: 
In this paper we experimentally compare three implementations of Winter demand commitment bargaining mechanism: a one-period implementation, a twoperiod implementation with low and with high delay costs. Despite the different theoretical predictions, our results show that the three different implementations result in similar outcomes in all our domains of investigation, namely: coalition formation, alignment with the Shapley value prediction and axioms satisfaction. Our results suggest that a lighter bargaining implementation with only one period is often sufficient in providing allocations that sustain the Shapley value as appropriate cooperative solution concept, while saving unnecessary costs in terms of time and resources.
Subjects: 
Nash Program
Shapley value
Experiments
Winter mechanism
JEL: 
C71
C72
C90
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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