Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248369 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WIDER Working Paper No. 2021/155
Verlag: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
Where does the money come from to buy votes? We argue that an important source of funds for vote-buying comes from 'contract clientelism', or the provision of public contracts to private firms in exchange for campaign donations. Using quantitative data on Colombian infrastructure contracts, we demonstrate that municipalities exhibit an 'electoral contracting cycle' in which incumbents assign low-quality contracts while on the campaign trail. Contract manipulations are more common in municipalities with higher reports of clientelist activity. Qualitative evidence from two Colombian cities, Barranquilla and Santa Marta, reinforce that infrastructure contractors provide a critical source of campaign finance and can create subnational political monopolies. The main contribution is to question the classic tension between clientelistic distribution and public goods provision. Politicians need to assign public contracts to secure funds for clientelistic handouts but, in so doing, they often promote low-quality public goods and weaken local states.
Schlagwörter: 
public contracts
campaign finance
vote-buying
clientelism
infrastructure
Colombia
public goods
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-92-9267-095-5
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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