Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/248289 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2020-17
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
Accounting for ambiguity aversion in dynamic decisions generally implies that either dynamic consistency or consequentialism must be given up. To gain insight into which of these principles better describes people's preferences we tested them using a variation of Ellsberg's three-color urn experiment. Subjects were asked to make a choice both before and after they received a signal. We found that most ambiguity neutral subjects satisfied both dynamic consistency and consequentialism and behaved consistent with subjective expected utility with Bayesian updating. The majority of ambiguity averse subjects violated at least one of the principles and they were more likely to satisfy consequentialism than dynamic consistency.
Schlagwörter: 
ambiguity
three-color Ellsberg paradox
consequentialism
dynamic consistency
JEL: 
C72
D81
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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