Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/247781
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 426
Publisher: 
European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics, Frankfurt (Oder)
Abstract: 
A game-theoretic setting is used to illuminate the conflict between vaccination proponents and vaccination opponents. A central result is that vaccination proponents could in principle persuade vaccination opponents to vaccinate by means of subsidization. Such a subsidy could increase benefits for both groups. Deeper analysis provides numerous further insights regarding the stability of these results.
Subjects: 
vaccination
corona
covid
game theory
moral hazard
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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