Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/247704 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 21-095
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
We design and implement an iterative, program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (IDAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to terminate even in larger cities, is difficult to manipulate in practice, and produces stable allocations. It can be further sped up by introducing two new features. First, allowing for an arbitrary share of facilities who participate in a centralized manner by submitting a rank-order-list over applicants. Second, by breaking ties in applicants' rank-order-lists on a first-come-first-serve basis, which sets incentives for programs to propose faster.
Subjects: 
Childcare assignment
deferred acceptance algorithm
JEL: 
C78
D02
D47
D82
I24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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