Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/247692 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 21-083
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper evaluates how sick pay mandates operate at the job level in the United States. Using the National Compensation Survey and difference-in-differences models, we estimate their impact on coverage rates, sick leave use, labor costs, and non-mandated fringe benefits. Sick pay mandates increase coverage significantly by 18 percentage points from a baseline level of 66% in the first two years. Newly covered employees take two additional sick days per year. We find little evidence that mandating sick pay crowds-out non-mandated fringe benefits. Finally, we develop a model of optimal sick pay provision and illustrate the trade-offs when assessing welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
sick pay mandates
take-up
social insurance
fringe benefits
moral hazard
unintended consequences
medical leave
National Compensation Survey
optimal social insurance
Baily-Chetty
welfare
JEL: 
I12
I18
J22
J28
J32
J38
J88
H75
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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