Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24767
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dc.contributor.authorBoockmann, Bernharden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T15:12:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T15:12:08Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24767-
dc.description.abstractIn this empirical paper, we look at individual voting behaviour of government delegates to the International Labour Organization (ILO). We distinguish between the instrumental motive for voting, which consists in the chance that one´s vote may turn the balance in favour of one´s preferred outcome, and non-instrumental motives, such as a desire for good reputation. Empirically, the two can be identified because two alternatives, abstaining and not participating in the vote, do not differ in their instrumental value, but are likely to differ with respect to reputation aspects. The model is estimated by a multinomial logit with country-specific unobserved heteroge-neity, using roll-call votes on the final passage of ILO conventions from 1977 to 1995. The hypothesis that voting is only instrumental is clearly rejected by the data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheim-
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x02-40en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordVotingen_US
dc.subject.keyworddiscrete choiceen_US
dc.subject.keywordinternational labour standardsen_US
dc.subject.keywordILOen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Sozialstandardsen_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungen_US
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.subject.stwInternational Labour Organisationen_US
dc.titleMixed motives: an empirical analysis of ILO roll-call votesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn725693533en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:858-

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