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dc.contributor.authorCerquera Dussán, Danielen
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:58:37Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:58:37Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24670-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant with network externalities and durable goods. We show that the threat of entry eliminates the commitment problem that an incumbent may face in its R&D decision due to the goods? durability. Moreover, a potential entrant over-invests in R&D and an established incumbent might exhibit higher, equal or lower R&D investments in comparison with the social optimum. In our model, the incumbent?s commitment problem and the efficiency of its R&D level are determined by the extent of the network externalities.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x07-086en
dc.subject.jelO31en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelD85en
dc.subject.jelD21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNetwork externalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordDurable Goodsen
dc.subject.keywordInnovationen
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Competitionen
dc.subject.stwInnovationswettbewerben
dc.subject.stwPotenzieller Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwDauerhaftes Konsumguten
dc.subject.stwNetwork Externalitiesen
dc.subject.stwIndustrielle Forschungen
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDurable Goods, Innovation and Network Externalities-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn556666879en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:7010en

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