Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24670
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dc.contributor.authorCerquera Dussán, Danielen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:58:37Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:58:37Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24670-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a model of R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant with network externalities and durable goods. We show that the threat of entry eliminates the commitment problem that an incumbent may face in its R&D decision due to the goods? durability. Moreover, a potential entrant over-invests in R&D and an established incumbent might exhibit higher, equal or lower R&D investments in comparison with the social optimum. In our model, the incumbent?s commitment problem and the efficiency of its R&D level are determined by the extent of the network externalities.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x07-086en_US
dc.subject.jelO31en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelD85en_US
dc.subject.jelD21en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordNetwork externalitiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordDurable Goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordInnovationen_US
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Competitionen_US
dc.subject.stwInnovationswettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwPotenzieller Wettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwDauerhaftes Konsumguten_US
dc.subject.stwNetwork Externalitiesen_US
dc.subject.stwIndustrielle Forschungen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDurable Goods, Innovation and Network Externalitiesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn556666879en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:7010-

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