Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24668 
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dc.contributor.authorBeschorner, Patrick Frank Ernsten
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:58:36Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:58:36Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24668-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze the incentive of the German postal service (Deutsche Post AG, DPAG) to increase quality in the light of the upcoming liberalization of the postal services market. Currently, there would be no incentive for DPAG to increase its quality if the market were not to be liberalized in six months. Therefore, we suggest that the current changes in market regulation have motivated this quality improvement. In particular we show that this rise in quality is only profitable to DPAG because it renders entry less profitable or even impossible. However, consumers benefit from higher quality, whetherentry is deterred or accommodated.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x07-083en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.jelL41en
dc.subject.jelL12en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordregulationen
dc.subject.keywordliberalizationen
dc.subject.keywordpostal servicesen
dc.subject.stwPostbeförderungen
dc.subject.stwDeregulierungen
dc.subject.stwDienstleistungsqualitäten
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleEntry Deterrence in Postal Service Markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn556666283en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:7007en

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