Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24647 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 07-064
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
Currently informal and formal international negotiations on climate change take place in an intensive way since the Kyoto Protocol expires already in 2012. A post-Kyoto regulation to combat global warming is not yet stipulated. Due to rapidly increasing greenhouse gas emission levels, industrialized countries urge major polluters from the developing world like China and India to participate in a future agreement. Whether these developing countries will do so, depends on the prevailing incentives to participate in international climate protection efforts. This paper identifies ancillary benefits of climate policy to provide important incentives to attend a new international protocol and to positively affect the likelihood of accomplishing a post-Kyoto agreement which includes commitments of developing countries.
Schlagwörter: 
ancillary benefits
climate change
international negotiations
chicken game
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
251.91 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.