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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 07-056
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
A simple Tiebout model is presented where states provide university education to both immobile and mobile students. State governments choose the quality of public universities by trading off the value of education for the local immobile student population and the costs, net of tuition revenues, of running the university. The quality of education and the assignment of students to universities in an efficient allocation are characterised. It is shown that decentralised decisions result in efficient choices if states are allowed to choose tuition levels freely. If tuition is capped, ine?ciently low qualities are likely to arise.
Schlagwörter: 
higher education
migration
fiscal externality
club good
tuition
JEL: 
H75
H77
I28
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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