Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24620 
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dc.contributor.authorSturm, Bodoen
dc.contributor.authorRiechmann, Thomasen
dc.contributor.authorDannenberg, Astriden
dc.contributor.authorVogt, Carstenen
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:58:06Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:58:06Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24620-
dc.description.abstractWe present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific preferences according to the Fehr and Schmidt model were matched into pairs and interacted with each other in a standard public good game and a public good game with punishment possibility. Our results show that the specific composition of groups significantly influences the subjects' performance in the public good games. We identify the aversion against advantageous inequity and the information about the coplayer's type as the main influencing factors for the behavior of subjects.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x07-034 [rev.]en
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24598en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordindividual preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordinequity aversionen
dc.subject.keywordexperimental economicsen
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwExperimenten
dc.titleInequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn543282171en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:6088en

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