Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/246172 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2595
Publisher: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
We study the relationship between banks' size and risk-taking in the context of supranational banking supervision. Consistently with theoretical work on banking unions and in contrast to analyses emphasising incentives under- pinned by the too-big-to-fail effect, we find an inverse relationship between banks' size and non-performing loan growth for a sample of European banks. Evidence is provided that the mechanism operates through the enhanced organisational efficiency of the supranational set-up rather than incentives alignment among the supervisors and the banks.
Subjects: 
Supervision
euro area
non-performing loans
banking union
too-big-to-fail
JEL: 
F33
G21
G28
G32
C20
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-4818-0
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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