Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24611
Authors: 
Mihailov, Alexander
Ullrich, Katrin
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 07-044
Abstract: 
The democratic accountability of policymaking institutions which are autonomous within delegated mandates has not received as much attention as their independence. We analyze in a theoretical model the effects of accountability in the form of possible overriding of economic policy decisions by the government under different degrees of independence of expert committees conducting monetary and fiscal policy. The equilibrium outcomes of such alternative institution-design frameworks are compared according to key macroeconomic performance criteria. Our results stress the trade-off between anchoring inflation expectations on target and output stabilization that is not solved with accountability.
Subjects: 
Independence
accountability
monetary policy
fiscal policy
expert committees
institution design
JEL: 
E63
E61
E52
E58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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