Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/245898 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 1157
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
This paper uses replicator dynamics to compare the steady states arising from two types of common property regimes - one in which over-exploiters are punished by the resource users themselves, and another where enforcement is handled by guards who collect a tax from the users. The use of guards requires a less restrictive set of parametric conditions in order to maintain an equilibrium with no over-exploiters. However, it can also stabilize an outcome in which all users over-exploit and are punished, but not enough to induce more cooperation (less resource extraction). These results can be used in guiding and structuring the formation of new common property regimes.
Subjects: 
Common Property
Evolutionary Game Theory
Institutions
Punishment
JEL: 
C7
Q2
Q5
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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