Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/245632 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 14581
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
This paper studies how increasing teacher compensation at hard-to-staff schools can reduce inequality in access to qualifed teachers. Leveraging an unconditional change in the teacher compensation structure in Perú, we first show causal evidence that increasing salaries at less desirable locations attracts better quality applicants and improves student test scores. We then estimate a model of teacher preferences over local amenities, school characteristics, and wages using geocoded job postings and rich application data from the nationwide centralized teacher assignment system. Our estimated model suggests that the current policy is both inefficient and not large enough to effectively undo the inequality of initial conditions that hard-to-staff schools and their communities face. Counterfactual analyses that incorporate equilibrium sorting effects characterize alternative wage schedules and quantify the cost of reducing structural inequality in the allocation of teacher talent across schools.
Subjects: 
inequality
teacher school choice
teacher wages
matching with contracts
JEL: 
J31
J45
I21
C93
O15
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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