Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24549
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Cerquera Dussán, Daniel | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-02-16T14:57:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2009-02-16T14:57:22Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24549 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes the impact of network externalities on R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant. The analysis shows that the incumbent always invests more than the entrant in the development of higher quality network goods. However, the incumbent exhibits a too low level of investments, while the entrant invests too much in R&D in comparison with the social optimum. In the model entry occurs too often in equilibrium. These inefficiencies are solely due to the presence of network externalities. By choosing compatible network goods, firms do not necessarily reduce the R&D competition intensity. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheim | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aZEW Discussion Papers |x06-093 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D85 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D21 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O31 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Network externalities | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Innovation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Imperfect Competition | en |
dc.title | R&D incentives, compatibility and network externalities | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 523076800 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5486 | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.