Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/245461 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9280
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We study strategic interaction in an experimental social-preferences vacuum chamber. We mute social preferences by letting participants knowingly interact with computers. Our new design allows for indirect strategic interaction: there are several waves in which computer players inherit the behavior of human players from the previous wave. We apply our method to investigate trembling-hand perfection in a normal-form version of the ultimatum game. We find that behavior remains far off from a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium under selfish preferences even towards the end of our experiment. The likely reasons for our findings are strategic uncertainty and incomplete learning.
Subjects: 
social preferences
induced-value theory
learning
ultimatum game
strategic interaction
JEL: 
C92
C72
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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