Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/245370
Authors: 
Englmaier, Florian
Grimm, Stefan
Grothe, Dominik
Schindler, David
Schudy, Simeon
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 9189
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but also render teams' identity and social-image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a non-routine task and identify the importance of these behavioral aspects. In a natural field experiment (n>1,700 participants), we vary the salience of team identity, social-image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased salience of team identity does not improve performance. Social-image motivates mainly the top-performing teams. Additional monetary incentives improve all teams' outcomes without crowding out teams' willingness to explore or perform similar tasks again.
Subjects: 
team-work
tournaments
rankings
incentives
identity
image concerns
innovation
exploration
natural field experiment
JEL: 
C93
D90
J24
J33
M52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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