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dc.contributor.authorAnger, Nielsen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper assesses the economic impacts of linking the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) to emerging schemes beyond Europe, in the presence of a post-Kyoto agreement in 2020. Simulations with a numerical multi-country model of the world carbon market show that linking the European ETS induces only marginal economic benefits: As trading is restricted to energy-intensive industries that are assigned generous initial emissions, the major compliance burden is carried by non-trading industries excluded from the linked ETS. In the presence of parallel government trading under a post-Kyoto Protocol, excluded sectors can however be substantially compensated by international trading at the country level, thus increasing the political attractiveness of the linking process. From an efficiency perspective, a desirable future climate policy regime represents a joint trading system that enables international emission trading between ETS companies and governments. While the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) cannot alleviate the inefficiencies of linked ETS, in a parallel or joint trading regime the access to abatement options of developing countries induces large additional cost savings. Restricting CDM access via a supplementarity criterion does not significantly decrease the economic benefits from project-based emission crediting.en_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheim-
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x06-58en_US
dc.subject.keywordEU ETSen_US
dc.subject.keywordEmission Tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordKyoto Protocolen_US
dc.subject.keywordClean Development Mechanismen_US
dc.titleEmission trading beyond Europe: linking schemes in a post-Kyoto worlden_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

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