Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/244381 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
UNRISD Occasional Paper - Overcoming Inequalities in a Fractured World: Between Elite Power and Social Mobilization No. 12
Publisher: 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva
Abstract: 
A well-established line of academic inquiry argues that state capture emerges in contexts of weak governance institutions. However, Panama is an outlier case featuring high levels of state capture despite strong governance institutions. To better understand state capture in Panama, this paper investigates the sources from which business elites draw their power-income control, business cohesion, political campaign contributions and revolving doors. Results show that state capture arose in Panama along with high income concentration among top elites, cohesion among a small cluster of family business groups, big businesses coordinating their electoral contributions, and appointments of businesspeople to strategic government positions. In closing, we suggest possible avenues of research to continue deciphering state capture, and provide some policy recommendations to reduce state capture in Panama.
Subjects: 
Business cohesion
business groups
campaign contributions
Latin America
network analysis
revolving doors
ISBN: 
978-92-9085-116-5
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
735.19 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.