Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/244346 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 112
Publisher: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Abstract: 
This paper studies a large majority election with voters who have heterogeneous, private preferences and exogenous private signals. We show that a Bayesian persuader can implement any state-contingent outcome in some equilibrium by providing additional information. In this setting, without the persuader's information, a version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds. Persuasion does not require detailed knowledge of the voters' private information and preferences: the same additional information is effective across environments. The results require almost no commitment power by the persuader. Finally, the persuasion mechanism is effective also in small committees with as few as 15 members.
Subjects: 
Information Aggregation
Bayes Correlated Equilibria
Persuasion
Condorcet Jury Theorem
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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