Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/244344 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 110
Verlag: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Zusammenfassung: 
Externalities and social preferences, such as patience and altruism, play a key role in the endogenous choice of social interactions, which in turn affect the diffusion of a pandemic or patterns of social segregation. We build a dynamic model, augmented with an SIR block, in which agents optimally choose the intensity of both general and group-specific social interactions. The equilibria in the baseline and the SIR-network model result from a matching process governed by optimally chosen contact rates. Taking into account agents' endogenous behavior generates markedly different predictions relative to a na¸ve SIR model. Through a planner's problem, we show that neglecting agents' response to risk leads to misguided policy decisions. Mobility restrictions beyond agents' restraint are needed to the extent that aggregate externalities are not curtailed by social preferences.
Schlagwörter: 
social interactions
pandemics
SIR network models
social preferences
social planner
targeted policies
JEL: 
D62
D64
D85
D91
E70
I10
I18
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.