Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/243311 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] KDI Journal of Economic Policy [ISSN:] 2586-4130 [Volume:] 43 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Korea Development Institute (KDI) [Place:] Sejong [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 55-77
Publisher: 
Korea Development Institute (KDI), Sejong
Abstract: 
In Korea, local governments and local agencies had to apply a version of the first price auction augmented by an ex-post screening process when they procure construction contracts. However, this first price auction had been criticized because it was felt that too much price competition could lead to poor ex-post performance in construction. In response, the existing auction method was recently replaced by a version of the average price auction with a similar screening process. This paper empirically examines the effectiveness of this reform and finds that the replacement only increases the fiscal burden of local governmental bodies without making any improvement in the ex-post performance.
Subjects: 
Local Government
Procurement
Average Price Auction
Screening
Price Competition
Ex-Post Performance
JEL: 
D44
H57
K12
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-sa Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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