Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/243281 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 316
Versionsangabe: 
Thursday 16th September, 2021
Verlag: 
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP - the government's ability to appoint independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury - helped attenuate bailout-related moral hazard. Banks were averse to these appointments - the empirical distribution of missed payments exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury led to improved bank performance, lower CEO pay, and higher stock market valuations.
Schlagwörter: 
Bank Bailout
TARP
Capital Purchase Program
Dividend Payments
Board Appointments
Bank Recapitalization
JEL: 
G01
G2
G28
G38
H81
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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