Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/243276 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 206
Versionsangabe: 
August 16, 2021
Verlag: 
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (a) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs; (b) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (c) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P loans are lower than those on bank loans. We test these predictions against data on P2P loans and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates that P2P lenders are bottom fishing, especially when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks.
Schlagwörter: 
P2P lending
bank lending
competition
JEL: 
G21
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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