Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24326 
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dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominique M.en
dc.contributor.authorSchwager, Roberten
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:54:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:54:20Z-
dc.date.issued1999-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24326-
dc.description.abstractWe use a stylized model to show that, if transfers to the poor are founded on a security argument, there is a negative trade-o¤ between law enforcement expenditures and criminality. In contrast, if transfers are based on altruism, the correlation between the same variables may appear positive. We argue that it provides a plausible explanation for the startling di¤erence between the US and Europe in crime statistics and law enforcement expenditures.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x99-44en
dc.subject.jelH3en
dc.subject.jelK0en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCriminalityen
dc.subject.keywordlaw enforcementen
dc.subject.keywordsocial systemen
dc.subject.stwKriminalpolitiken
dc.subject.stwKriminalitäten
dc.subject.stwEinkommensverteilungen
dc.subject.stwInnere Sicherheiten
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.subject.stwWesteuropaen
dc.titleLaw enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn853788774en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:5257en

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