Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24312
Authors: 
Esteller-Moré, Álex
Solé-Ollé, Albert
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 99-28
Abstract: 
Concurrent taxation is a feature of many federal systems. As a consequence of this fact, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. This paper carries out a theoretical analysis of the interdependent tax-setting decisions of federal and regional governments, paying special attention to institutional features that characterise the U.S. federal system in practice and that formally link the taxes employed at various levels of government (i.e.: tax deductibility). The developed hypotheses are tested with data corresponding to the U.S. personal income taxes for the last decade. We find that when the federal government increases taxes, there is a significant positive response of regional taxes.
JEL: 
H21
H3
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.16 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.