Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/243073 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2021-002
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
One's willingness to accept an outcome or even to correct it depends on whether or not the underlying procedure is deemed legitimate. We manipulate the role allocation procedure in the dictator game to illustrate that this belief is not independent of the outcome and is self-serving in its nature. Our findings suggest that there may be some positive level of dissatisfaction with virtually any social outcome in the populace without there being anything wrong as far as the underlying procedure. We also discuss the perceptions of fairness and merit as potential drivers of the observed behavioral phenomenon.
Schlagwörter: 
fairness
entitlement
merit
redistribution
procedural preferences
dictator game
JEL: 
D63
D91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.11 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.