Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/243073 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2021-002
Publisher: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Jena
Abstract: 
One's willingness to accept an outcome or even to correct it depends on whether or not the underlying procedure is deemed legitimate. We manipulate the role allocation procedure in the dictator game to illustrate that this belief is not independent of the outcome and is self-serving in its nature. Our findings suggest that there may be some positive level of dissatisfaction with virtually any social outcome in the populace without there being anything wrong as far as the underlying procedure. We also discuss the perceptions of fairness and merit as potential drivers of the observed behavioral phenomenon.
Subjects: 
fairness
entitlement
merit
redistribution
procedural preferences
dictator game
JEL: 
D63
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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