Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242910 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
IFS Working Paper No. W21/11
Publisher: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Abstract: 
We quantify how bargaining power is distributed when spouses make financial decisions together. We build a model in which each spouse has a risk preference and must bargain with each other to make asset decisions for the household. By structurally estimating the model with longitudinal data from Australian households, we show that the average household's asset allocation reflects the husband's risk preference 44% more than the wife's. This gap in bargaining power is partially explained by gender differences in income and employment status, but is also due to gender effects. We provide further evidence that links the distribution of bargaining power to views on gender norms in the cross-section.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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