Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/242855
Autor:innen: 
Lenhard, Severin
Datum: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Papers No. 21-04
Verlag: 
University of Bern, Department of Economics, Bern
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the interest rate's effect on the stability of cartels. A low interest rate implies a high discount factor and thus increases cartel stability. If firms access the capital market, an additional effect comes into play: a low interest rate lowers investment costs, resulting in more profitable deviations from the collusive agreement. We propose a new measure for a cartel's stability regarding the two opposing effects. Stability is U-shaped in the interest rate. We test our theory using a dataset of 615 firms and find supporting evidence. We conclude that the current unusually low interest rate facilitates collusion.
Schlagwörter: 
Collusion
Interest Rate
Repeated Game
Survival Analysis
JEL: 
C41
D43
K21
L40
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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