Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/242535
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper Series No. 2015/04
Publisher: 
Auckland University of Technology (AUT), Faculty of Business, Economics and Law, Auckland
Abstract: 
We explore whether the nature of piracy or the counterfeiting activity and the competition between the copyright holder and the pirate(s) matter in a given regime of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) protection. Generally, the nature of piracy can be of two types, commercial and end-user; and the nature of competition between copyright holder and if the pirate is commercial can be either in price or quantity depending on the pirated good. We find irrespective of the nature of piracy or competition, when the consumers' tastes are sufficiently diverse and IPR protection is weak, it is profitable for the copyright holder to accommodate the pirate(s), while deter the pirate(s) in all other situations. The relationship between the quality of pirated good and piracy rate can be monotonic or non-monotonic. Piracy is more likely to survive under commercial piracy than under end-user piracy. The relationship between private and public anti-piracy measures is non-monotonic.
Subjects: 
IPR protection
private copyright protection
piracy rate
product quality
commercial piracy
end-user piracy
JEL: 
D23
D43
L13
L86
O3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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