Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242458 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics
Verlag: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
Belief elicitation is important in many different fields of economic research. We show that how a researcher elicits such beliefs-in particular, whether the belief is about the participant's opponent, an unrelated other, or the population of others-affects the processes involved in the formation of belief reports. We find a clear consensus effect. Yet, when matching the opponent's action would lead to a low payoff and the researcher asks for the belief about this opponent, ex-post rationalization kicks in and beliefs are re-adjusted again. Hence, we recommend to ask about unrelated others or about the population in such cases, as 'opponent beliefs' are even more detached from the beliefs participants had when deciding about their actions in the corresponding game. We find no evidence of a hindsight bias or wishful thinking in any of the treatments.
Schlagwörter: 
Belief Elicitation
Belief Formation
Belief-Action Consistency
Framing Effects
Projection
Consensus Effect
Wishful Thinking
Hindsight Bias
Ex-Post Rationalization
JEL: 
C72
C91
D84
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

Datei(en):
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