Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242439 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics
Publisher: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
We analyze a model of endogenous two-sided network formation where players are affected by uncertainty in their opponents' decisions. We model this uncertainty using the notion of equilibrium under ambiguity (Eichberger and Kelsey, 2014). Unlike the set of Nash equilibria, the set of equilibria under ambiguity does not always include underconnected and thus inefficient networks such as the empty network. On the other hand, it may include networks with unreciprocated, one-way links, which comes with an efficiency loss as linking efforts are costly. We characterize equilibria under ambiguity and provide conditions under which increased player optimism comes with an increase in efficiency in equilibrium. Next, we analyze the dynamic situation with one-sided, myopic updating with regular optimistic shocks and derive a global stability condition of benefit-maximizing equilibrium networks.
JEL: 
D85
D83
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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