Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242429 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics
Publisher: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
Freelancing human experts play an important role in Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). Expert ratings partially reflect the reciprocal network of ICO members and analysts. Ratings predict ICO success, but highly imperfectly so. Favorably rated ICOs tend to fail when more ratings reciprocate prior ratings. Failure despite strong ratings is also frequent when analysts have a history of optimism, and when reviews strike a particulary positive tone. These findings help illuminate the workings of ICOs for funding new ventures, and the rich data and the specific institutional setup also yield insights pertinent to the literature on equity analysts and rating agencies.
Subjects: 
Analysts
Asymmetric Information
FinTech
Initial Coin Offering (ICO)
JEL: 
G14
G24
L26
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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