Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242348 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics
Publisher: 
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, Kiel, Hamburg
Abstract: 
We model asset opacity and deposit rate choices of banks who imperfectly compete for uninsured deposits, are subject to runs, and face a threat of entry. Higher competition increases deposit rates and bank fragility, resulting in an intermediate socially optimal level of bank competition. We provide a novel theory of bank opacity. The cost of opacity is more partial runs by creditors, which induces costly liquidation of investment and lowers current profits. The benefit of opacity is to deter entry of competitors, which increases bank charter value. Banks can be excessively opaque, motivating transparency regulation.
Subjects: 
Competition
entry
opacity
fragility
bank run
global games
competition policy
transparency regulation
JEL: 
G01
G21
G28
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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