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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
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[Journal:] Review of International Economics [ISSN:] 1467-9396 [Volume:] 29 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1013-1024
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper shows that investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) make multinational firms more aggressive by increasing cost-reducing investments with the aim to enlarge the potential compensation an ISDS provision may offer. While a larger investment reduces the market distortion, it will also make potential compensations larger. Consequently, potential compensations to a foreign investor do not imply a zero-sum game. ISDS may decrease domestic welfare, in particular if the investment leads to the establishment of an export platform, and we find that even global welfare may decline.
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